Radio easy hack eu volkswagen11/3/2023 These encrypted and signature checked updates are by and large still fairly vulnerable - often due to logic errors in the complex upgrade processes and occasionally due to a strange insistence on using RSA using PKCS#1.5 with e=3 and inadequate padding validation. One interesting difference and trend in automotive control modules (also mentioned in Willem's fantastic write-up) is that many EU modules started adding signature checking and encrypted updates in the late 2000s, while most US and Japanese automakers have only done so in the last 2-3 years. And instead of the wacky SGO format inside of FRF update files, they use the ASAM MCD-2 D-ODX format to define flashing layers. More modern VW control units are the same in broad strokes - they use UDS on ISO-TP instead of KWP on TP2.0, but this is just evolution of the same fundamentals. ![]() This is probably one of the best write-ups I've seen around the basics of automotive control unit reverse engineering.
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